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Abstract
I estimate returns to college education for women, accounting for how assortative marriage
matching and the home production affect labor supply and fertility choice, based on the National
Longitudinal Study of Youth 1979 and the NLSY79 Child/Young Adults 1986—2012. First,
the gain from home production, as measured by the average educational outcome of children,
explains more than 80% of the total return. The direct impact of women’s college education
on children’s outcome is much larger than the indirect effect through the household income and
time investment. Women’s college attainment rates would decrease by 8% without assortative
marriage matching and by 17% without the direct impact on children’s educational attainment.
Second, assortative marriage matching accounts for 21% of returns to college education for
women with average characteristics. High-ability students benefit more from the assortative
marriage matching than low-ability students. For low-ability students, assortative marriage
matching increases the inequality in college attainment rates by family backgrounds. Finally,
women’s labor force participation rates would increase by 24% if the marginal productivity
of household income on children’s outcome increases by 10%. As a comparison, if the wage
structure of women were to be the same as men, the labor force participation rate would increase
by 8%.
∗Department of Economics, Washington University in St. Louis; email:sunhamyong@wustl.edu
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1 Introduction
In 1980, the college enrollment rate for men was 8% higher than for women. However, the trend has
reversed, with the rate for women being 4% higher than for men in 2015.1 Yet, increased college
attainment rates have not translated into increased representation in the workplace, and 10% fewer
married women work than do married men in 2015. The gender wage gap in the labor market does
not seem to explain this disparity. Women’s earnings as a percentage of men’s increased by more
than 25% between 1980 and 2015; but during the same period, the proportion of working married
women increased by only 4%. Why do women get more education than men but work less? Why
has the proportion of working married women stagnated, even though the gender wage gap has
decreased?
One potentially important component accounting for returns to college education for women
might be gains from better child outcomes. A growing body of literature has shown a causal
impact of maternal education on children’s outcome, such as infant health (Currie and Moretti,
2003). The main take away from this literature is that focusing only on the labor market return
would understate the total return from college education for women. Following this literature,
I also consider a child’s outcome to account for returns to college education for women. The
key differences are as follows. First, I use a long-term child outcome, the average educational
attainment of children. Second, I quantify the relative importance of home production and labor
market earnings in explaining the total return from college education.
On the other hand, assortative marriage matching with respect to educational attainment can
be also related. The proportion of married couples with the same educational attainments has
substantially increased over the last few decades (Greenwood et al., 2014). If college education is
a determining factor in spouse’s characteristics, gains from marriage can explain a substantial part
of returns to college education for women, hence the high college attainment rate.
In this paper, I quantify the returns to college education for women, putting special emphasis
on how assortative marriage matching and home production technology affect labor supply and
fertility decisions among women. To my knowledge, it is the first paper accounting for a long-term
child outcome, in particular, the average educational attainment, and assortative marriage matching
when estimating returns to college education for women. I also quantify the heterogeneous returns
of college education for women by family background, physical appearance, and ability. To isolate
the importance of the assortative marriage matching process, I consider a counterfactual situation in
which educational attainment becomes irrelevant to marriage matching and then quantify how the
returns from college education for women are affected under this counterfactual case. I also assess
1Data comes from the Current Population Survey. The proportion of men who have four-year college degrees was
8% higher than that of women in 1980. The gap decreased continuously over the decades, and there is no difference
between men and women in terms of the proportions of four-year graduates in 2015.
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the importance of gender wage gap and home production technology, in particular, the marginal
contribution of mother’s time and household income to child’s development process, in explaining
women’s labor supply and educational choice.
Increasing the female labor supply is often considered the key to boosting economic growth.2 At
the same time, a growing literature emphasizes a substantial impact of mother’s time investment,
especially during early childhood, on child outcome (Cunha et al. (2010), and Del Boca et al.
(2014)). The previous literature focused on how households balance between the gains from labor
market and those from home production by property choosing wife’s labor supply, taking couple’s
educational attainments as give. However, women’s college education has substantial impact on the
marriage matching, labor earnings as well as child outcomes. Moreover, because college education
itself is associated with a huge amount of public financing, studying the margin between mother’s
educational attainment and children’s educational attainments can provide a useful framework to
evaluate various policies in their impacts on the welfare of the current and the next generations.
To estimate the returns for college education for women, I develop a structural model for the
problem of women’s schooling choices, accounting for labor supply and fertility decisions over the
life cycle conditional on marriage matching outcome. At the beginning, women decide whether to
attend college. The time and type of the marriage matching depend on an exogenous matching
process which depends on women’s ability (AFQT), educational attainment, family background
measured by the educational attainment of the mother and father, and physical appearance mea-
sured by the body mass index (BMI). In each period, married women make decisions about their
labor force participation and fertility. Single women make only the labor force participation de-
cision. Individuals get utility from consumption, leisure, and the outcome of home production as
measured by the educational attainment of their children. The wage rates of women change over
the life cycle, and lagged labor force participation decisions affect their wage rate through human
capital accumulation. I do not model endogenous transfers from husbands to wives and the amount
of monetary investment in the development process of children. Instead, I assume that married
women represent the households and take their spouses’ income as exogenous resources that add
to the budget. Home production technology is affected by a woman’s ability, educational attain-
ment, household income, the average labor market participation rates, and the number of existing
children.
I use the National Longitudinal Study of Youth 1979 (NLSY79) and the NLSY79 Child/Young
Adults 1986—2012. The two data sets are linked so that I can match the mother and children.
However, the NLSY79 is not a household survey with matched information between husband and
wife. Instead, the data provide parts of the partner’s information, such as income, age, and highest
grade completed. My sample consists of all female students aged 14 to 22 in 1979. I cannot
estimate the model with male data because the NLSY79 Child/Young Adults 1986—2012 only
2IMF Staff Discussion Note (2013), “Women, Work, and the Economy: Macroeconomic Gains from Gender Equity”
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matches mothers and their children. The model is estimated in three stages. In the first stage, I
estimate the marriage matching process, the home production technology, wage rates of women,
income of husbands, and the conditional choice probability (CCP). In the second stage, I estimate
preference parameters based on a CCP approach, taking the first stage estimation as given. In the
third stage, I estimate the returns to college education for women taking, the value function in the
second stage estimation as given.
The results can be summarized as follows. First, the gain from home production, as measured
by a child’s educational attainment, explains more than 80% of the total return. The direct impact
of women’s college education on children’s outcome is estimated to be much larger than the indirect
effect through the household income and time investment. Second, assortative marriage matching
accounts for 21% of returns to college education for women with average characteristics. High-
ability students benefit more from the assortative marriage matching than low-ability students.
For low-ability students, assortative marriage matching increases inequality in college attainment
rates by family backgrounds. Finally, the labor force participation rate would increase by 24%
if the marginal productivity of household income on children’s outcome increases by 10%. As a
comparison, if the wage structure of women were to be the same as men, the labor force participation
rate would increase by 8%.
This paper relates to the literature on returns to college education (Rosen & Willis, 1979).
Different from previous studies that focus on returns to college education for men in terms of labor
earning, this paper quantifies the respective roles of labor market earnings, assortative marriage
matching, and home production in accounting for the returns to college education for women.
Second, this paper relates to the literature on the economic implications of assortative marriage
matching. Greenwood et al.(2014) shows that assortative matching increases income inequalities
compared to the random matching. This paper extends this literature by providing heterogeneous
returns from assortative marriage matching by ability, family background, and physical appearance.
Third, the most closely related papers are Ge (2011) and Bronson (2015) which estimated returns
to college education for women (Ge, 2011) and college major choice (Bronson, 2015) accounting
for assortative marriage matching. The key difference is that this paper uses children’s educational
attainment as a relevant outcome of home production in addition to direct utility from assortative
marriage matching. Ge (2011) only considers utility from marrying similarly educated spouses.
Bronson (2015) does not specifically focus on children’s educational attainment in home produc-
tion. My paper focuses on the quality of children and utilize the observed outcome of children’s
educational attainments to estimate how mother’s AFQT, educational attainment, labor supply,
and family income affect the quality of children. This helps to isolate the direct effect of mother’s
education on the child outcome from indirect effect through household income and mother’s time
investment. Finally, this paper relates to the studies that investigate the impact of family back-
ground on college enrollment decisions (Cameron & Heckman (1998), Lochner & Monge (2011)).
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This paper contributes to the literature by showing that assortative marriage matching can increase
inequalities between rich and poor students in terms of college education.
In Section 2, I provide a structural model. I discuss the conditional value function and finite
state dependence in Section 3. In Section 4, I discuss data and sample selection. In section 5, I
explain the identification and estimation strategy of the model. I document the estimation results
in Section 6. I discuss returns to college education for women in Section 7. I discuss counterfactual
analyses in Section 8. I conclude in Section 9.
2 The Model
I consider a problem of a female high school senior who needs to decide whether to attend college or
not. She takes into account the effect of her educational attainment on future wage rate, marriage
matching, and the educational attainments of her children. There exists an exogenous process that
determines the marriage matching. Women’s schooling choice conditional on other given traits affect
the probability of remaining single, marrying college graduated, and marrying high school graduated
spouse. Divorce is not allowed, and the husbands always works. The household chooses wife’s labor
supply as well as fertility decision to maximize household utility. Only married couples are allowed
to have children, and the utility from offspring is based on the average educational attainment of
children. Home production technology depends on woman’s ability, educational attainment, the
number of kids, the average household income and the average labor force participation rates of
women over the life-cycle.
2.1 Preference
The household gets the utility from the total consumption of the household, leisure of the wife, and
expected kid’s outcome. It is a unitary model so that there is no distinction between the utility of
husband and the utility of wife. Husbands always work so that they do not get utility from leisure.
Single women have the same preference for consumption and leisure, but they cannot have children.
2.1.1 Utility from Consumption
In each period, the household gets utility from the total consumption. For each t ∈ {1, · · · , T}, the
utility from consumption is
uct = φclnCt (2.1)
2.1.2 Utility from Leisure
The utility from leisure consists of two parts: (i) fixed cost for labor force participation of the wife
(φl), and (ii) utility from young child and its interaction with household income denoted by Mt.
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Let DYt = 1 if kid’s age is less than or equal to 2 and let Dsingle is the dummy variable for being
single.
ult = φl1 · (1− dt) + κ1 ·DYt + pi1 ·DYt ·Mt + νsingleDsingle (2.2)
ult = φl1 · (1− dt) + κ1 ·DYt + pi1 ·DYt ·Mt + pi2Mt(HGC − SPHGC)2 + νsingleDsingle
2.1.3 Utility from Offspring
The utility from offspring is determined by expected kid’s outcome measured by the average edu-
cational attainment of the children edukid.
ukidT = φkedukid (2.3)
To account for quantity-quality tradeoff, I follow Gayle et al. (2013).
edukid = E
[∑N
j=1 edukid,j
N
]
(2.4)
,where N ≤ 2 is the total number of children.3
2.1.4 Utility from Assortative Matching
The household also gets negative utility if husband and wife have different educational attainment.
Let wm and wf be the wage rate of the husband and the wife respectively and let Hm and Hf
be the working hours of the husband and the wife for each year. Because husband always work,
Hm = 1.
4 Let Mt(Hf ) be the household income in each year.
umt = φmMt(Hf )(HGC − SPHGC)2 (2.5)
,where HGC and SPHGC indicate the highest grade completed by the wife and the husband.
3I allow the household to have at most 2 children.
4One unit of time refers to 2,000 hours per year.
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2.1.5 Contemporaneous Household Utility
The contemporaneous utility of the household consists of 4 components. The household gets the
utility from offsprings in period t = T . The household has at most two children. I assume that
the utility is linear with respect to the expected final educational attainment of the kid, denoted
as ˜edukid. The contemporaneous utility at period t can be written as
ut = u
c
t + u
l
t + u
m
t ∀t ∈ {0, · · · , T − 1} (2.6)
uT = u
c
T + u
l
T + u
kid
T (2.7)
2.2 Costs and Constraints
There is no savings or borrowing. I do not consider non-labor income other than transfers from
husbands. The budget constraint of the household in each year can be written as
Ct ≤ wmt ·Hm + wft ·Hf (2.8)
2.3 Wage Rate
The productivity in the labor market depends on the educational attainment (HGC : highest grade
completed), individual ability (AFQT), age, and two periods lagged labor market participation
history. Let wt be the measurement error observed in data.
lnwt = β0 + β1 ·AFQT + β2 ·HGC + β3 · aget + β4 · age2t + β5 · dnt−1 + β6 · dnt−2 + wt (2.9)
2.4 Home Production Technology
The main outcome of home production is the quality of the child measured by the educational
attainment. It depends on the inherited ability as well as parent’s time and money investment.
Child’s inherited ability is captured by mother’s AFQT score. Household’s income also affects
kid’s outcome through the amount of spending on foods, books, toys and education. Let lnM =
1
T
∑T
t=1 lnMt be the average household income over the life-cycle. Mother’s time investment also
affects the outcome.5 Let Dwork be a dummy variable indicating whether the mother ever worked
for the first two years after the birth. Then the home production technology can be written as
5I do not allow intertemporal complementarity in mother’s time investment on child’s outcome as discussed in
Heckman et al. (2010)
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edukid = γ0 + γ1 ·AFQT + γ2 ·HGC + γ3 · (HGC × SPHGC) + γ4 · lnM
+ γ5 ·Dwork + kid
(2.10)
, where kid ∼ N(0, σk). Husband’s educational attainment is relevant to home production
technology only through the household income.
2.5 Optimization
Let Ωt = {Zt, Xt, et} be the state variable at period t where Zt = (HGC,SPHGC,AFQT ) includes
time invariant observed characteristics and spouse’s income at period t, Xt includes time variant ob-
served characteristics and lagged choice variables. In particular, Xt = (Aget, dt−2, dt−1, bt−2, bt−1,∑t−1
s=1 bt−s,
∑2
s=1 bt−s,Mt,mt) where Aget is the age in period t, dt−s is lagged labor market partic-
ipation decision at s periods before, bt−s is lagged fertility decision at s periods before,
∑t−1
s=1 bt−s
is the number of children,
∑2
s=1 bt−s is the number of young kids with age less or equal to 2, Mt
is the household income in period t, and mt is the marital status. Let et = (ηt, dt) be the ran-
dom component such that ηt is the shocks governing the transition probability of the time variant
state variables (spouse’s income) and dt is the vector of alternative specific preference shocks.
Recall that the household is assumed to have at most 2 children. Let {Cot (Ωt), dot (Ωt), bot (Ωt)}Tt=0
be the optimal choice of the household given state space Ωt. Individuals do not choose working
hours Hf but it is considered as fixed. Denote the equilibrium household income as M
o
t (Ωt) =
wmt · Hm + wft · dot (Ωt)Hf . Then I can write down the deterministic part of the current period
utility at the optimum as follows.
Utility from Consumption at the Optimum
uct(Ωt) = φc
[
ln
(
wmt ·Hm + wt · dot (Ωt)Hf
)]
= φc
[
lnMot (Ωt)
]
(2.11)
Utility from Leisure at the Optimum
ult(Ωt) = φl(1− dot (Ωt)) + κ1 ·DYt + pi1 ·DYt ·Mot (Ωt) + νsingleDsingle(Ωt) (2.12)
Utility from Offspring at the Optimum
ukidT (ΩT ) = φk ·
∑N
j=1 edukid,j
N
(2.13)
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Contemporaneous Utility at the Optimum
ut(Ωt) = u
c
t(Ωt) + u
l
t(Ωt) ∀t ∈ {1, · · · , T − 1} (2.14)
uT (ΩT ) = u
c
T (ΩT ) + u
l
T (ΩT ) + u
kid
T (ΩT ) (2.15)
3 The Conditional Value Function
There are 4 discrete choices denoted by dt ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}, which refers to (not working,not having a
new baby), (not working, having a new baby), (working, not having a new baby), (working, having
a baby), respectively. Denote (dtj = 1) = jt be the choice specific preference shock. Let V t(Ωt) be
the ex-ante value function that represents the continuation value at period t given state Ωt before
the choice specific shock t = (1t, 2t, 3t, 4t) is realized. Let f(Ωt+1|Ωt, dt = k) be the probability
density function of the transition probability from the current period state Ωt to tomorrow’s state
variable Ωt+1 conditional on today’s choice dt = k. Let δ(Ωt, t) = arg maxdt∈{1,2,3,4}
[
u(Ωt, dt) +
dt + β
∫
V t+1(Ωt+1)f(Ωt+1|Ωt, dt)dΩt+1
]
be the optimal choice at period t given state variable
(Ωt, t). Let g() be the probability density function of the choice specific shock. Then the ex-ante
value function can be written as
V t(Ωt) = max
{ds}Tt
Et
{ T∑
s=t
3∑
k=0
I(dt = k) · βs−t
[
ut(Ωt|dt = k) + (dt = k)
]}
(3.1)
Let Vt(Ωt, t) be the ex-post valuation function conditional on the realization of the preference
shock t. Then I can rewrite equation 3.1 as
V t(Ωt) =
∫
Vt(Ωt, t)g(t)dt (3.2)
From the Bellman’s principle, equation (3.2) can be written as
V t(Ωt) =
3∑
dt=0
∫
I(δt(Ωt, t) = dt)
[
u(Ωt, dt) + t + β
∫
V t+1(Ωt+1)f(Ωt+1|Ωt, dt)dΩt+1
]
g(t)dt
(3.3)
Let vkt (Ωt) or vt(Ωt, dt = k) be the conditional value function of choosing dt = k given the state
variable Ωt. It represents the present discount value net of t of choosing dt = k and behaving
optimally from the next period onward. Then I have
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vkt (Ωt, dt = k) = ut(Ωt, dt = k) + β
∫
V t+1(Ωt+1)f(Ωt+1|Ωt, dt = k)dΩt+1 (3.4)
for k ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}. Recall that the optimal decision rule at period t as
δt(Ωt, t) = arg max
dt
{vt(Ωt, dt) + (dt)} (3.5)
Let pt(dt|Ωt) be the probability of observing dt conditional on Ωt, then it can be written as
pt(dt|Ωt) =
∫
I{δt(Ωt, t) = dt}g(t)dt
=
∫
I
{
arg max
kt∈{0,1,2,3}
[
vt(Ωt, kt) + t(kt)
]
= dt
}
g(t)dt
(3.6)
Given the cumulative density function of t, G(t), I can restate (3.6) as
pt(dt = k|Ωt) = Pr
[
vt(Ωt, k) + t(k) > vt(Ωt, k
′) + t(k′), ∀k′ 6= k
]
= Pr
[
vt(Ωt, k)− vt(Ωt, k′) + t(k) > t(k′), ∀k′ 6= k
]
=
∫ vt(Ωt,k)−vt(Ωt,0)+t(k)
−∞
· · ·
∫ vt(Ωt,k)−vt(Ωt,3)+t(k)
−∞
dG(0t, 1t, · · · , 3t|Ωt)
=
∫ ∞
−∞
G1(vt(Ωt, k)− vt(Ωt, 0) + kt, · · · , kt, · · · , vt(Ωt, k)− vt(Ωt, 3) + kt|Ωt)dkt
(3.7)
,where Gj(·) = ∂G(·)∂j for j ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}. Define Q1(vt(Ωt, dt = k) − vt(Ωt, dt = 0)) = pt(k|Ωt).
Following Proposition 1 of Hotz and Miller (1993), it can be shown that ∀Ωt and ∀p ∈ [0, 1], the set
{vt(Ωt, dt = k)− vt(Ωt, dt = 0) ∈ < : Q1(vt(Ωt, dt = k)− vt(Ωt, dt = 0)|Ωt) = p} is either empty or
singleton. Therefore, Qk(·) is invertible. For each element in state space at time t, Ωt ∈ Ωˆ, I have
one-to-one mapping between pt(dt = k|Ωt) and vt(Ωt, dt = k)− vt(Ωt, dt = 0), and I can express
vt(Ωt, dt = k)− vt(Ωt, dt = 0) = Q−11
(
pt(dt = k|Ωt)
)
(3.8)
for each Ωt and k ∈ {1, 2, 3}. Let ωd
(
pt(d|Ωt)
)
= E
(
dt|δ(Ωt, t) = k
)
, which is the expected
value of the structural shock associated with alternative k conditional on that k is the optimal
choice given (Ωt, t). Then the conditional value function at period t with state Ωt can be written
as
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vt(Ωt, dt = k) = u(Ωt, dt = k) + βEt
{
3∑
k=1
pt+1(k|Ωt+1) ·
[
vt+1(Ωt+1, dt+1 = k) + ωk
(
pt+1(k|Ωt+1)
)]
+ pt+1(0|Ωt+1) ·
[
vt+1(Ωt+1, dt+1 = 0) + ω0
(
pt+1(0|Ωt+1)
)]}
(3.9)
The expectation in equation (3.9) is over the transition probability dF (Ωt+1|Ωt, dt = k) =
f(Ωt+1|Ωt, dt = 1)dΩt+1. Note that pt+1(0|Ωt+1) = 1 −
∑3
k=1 pt+1(k|Ωt+1). By substituting this
into equation (3.9), I obtain
vt(Ωt, dt = k) = u(Ωt, dt = k) + βEt
{
3∑
k=1
pt+1(k|Ωt+1) ·
[
vt+1(Ωt+1, dt+1 = k)− vt+1(Ωt+1, dt+1 = 0)
]
+
3∑
k=1
pt+1(k|Ωt+1)
[
ωk
(
pt+1(k|Ωt+1)
)− ω0(pt+1(0|Ωt+1))]
+
{
vt+1(Ωt+1, dt+1 = 0) + ω0
(
pt+1(0|Ωt+1)
)}}
(3.10)
From equation (3.8), the conditional value function can be written as
vt(Ωt, dt = k) = u(Ωt, dt = k) + βEt
{
3∑
k=1
pt+1(k|Ωt+1)
[
Q−1k
(
pt+1(dt+1 = k|Ωt+1)
)
+ ωk
(
pt+1(k|Ωt+1)
)− ω0(pt+1(0|Ωt+1))]+ vt+1(Ωt+1, dt+1 = 0) + ω0(pt+1(0|Ωt+1))}
(3.11)
Similarly, I can express vt+1(Ωt+1, dt+1 = k) as
vt+1(Ωt+1, dt+1 = k) = u(Ωt+1, dt+1 = k) + βEt+1
{
3∑
k=1
pt+2(k|Ωt+2)
[
Q−1k
(
pt+2(dt+2 = k|Ωt+2)
)
+ ωk
(
pt+2(k|Ωt+2)
)− ω0(pt+2(0|Ωt+2))]+ vt+2(Ωt+2, dt+2 = 0) + ω0(pt+2(0|Ωt+2))}
(3.12)
By doing this repetitively for vt+s(Ωt+s, dt+s = 0) where s = 1, · · · , ρ, I obtain
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vt(Ωt, dt = k) = u(Ωt, dt = k) + βEt
{
ρ∑
s=1
βs
[
u(Ωt+s, dt+s = 0) +
3∑
k=1
pt+s(k|Ωt+s)
× {Q−1k (pt+s(dt+s = k|Ωt+s))+ ωk(pt+s(k|Ωt+s))− ω0(pt+s(0|Ωt+s))}]
+ βρ+1
[
vt+s(Ωt+ρ+1, dt+ρ+1 = 0) + ω0
(
pt+ρ+1(0|Ωt+ρ+1)
)]}
(3.13)
Assume that the choice specific preference shock t follows the Type 1 Extreme Value distribu-
tion. Then the probability density function of it is
f(it) =
1
σ
exp
(− it − µ
σ
− exp(−it − µ
σ
)
)
(3.14)
, where µ is the location parameter and σ > 0 is the scale parameter. Then the following
equalities hold:
Q−1k
(
pt(dt = k|Ωt)
)
= vt(Ωt, dt = k)− vt(Ωt, dt = 0)
= σln
[
pt(k|Ωt)/pt(0|Ωt)
] (3.15)
ωk
(
pt(k|Ωt)
)
=
γ
σ
− σln[pt(k|Ωt)] (3.16)
ω0
(
pt(k|Ωt)
)
=
γ
σ
− σln[pt(0|Ωt)] (3.17)
from equation (3.15) and (3.17), I can show
ωk
(
pt(k|Ωt)
)− ω0(pt(0|Ωt)) = −σln[pt(k|Ωt)/pt(0|Ωt)]
= −Q−1k
(
pt(dt = k|Ωt)
) (3.18)
No matter which dt = k
∗ is chosen as the baseline decision, the following equation holds.
ωk(pt(k|Ωt)− ωk∗(pt(k∗|Ωt) +Q−1k,k∗(pt(dt = k|Ωt)) = 0 (3.19)
, where Q−1k,k∗(pt(dt = k|Ωt)) = vt(Ωt, dt = k)− vt(Ωt, dt = k∗). Therefore, if there is path that
satisfies the finite state dependence of length ρ,6 where d∗ = (d∗t , · · · , d∗t+ρ) and d
′
= (d
′
t, · · · , d
′
t+ρ)
6Fix a state space at period t and consider two different choices made at period t. If I can find two sets of choice
variables that follow each of the choice made at period t for a finite period ρ and lead to the same state spaces at
period t+ρ, the two sets of choice variables chosen from period t to t+ρ are said to satisfy the finite state dependence.
More discussion can be found in section 4.
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denoting each of the path, the difference in conditional valuation function at period t can be written
as
vt(Ωt, d
∗
t )− vt(Ωt, d
′
t) = u(Ωt, dt = k)− u(Ωt, dt = 0)
+ Et
{
ρ∑
s=1
βs
[
u(Ωt+s(d
∗
t+s), d
∗
t+s)− σln
[
pt+s(d
∗
t+s|Ωt+s)
]]
−
ρ∑
s=1
βs
[
u(Ωt+s(d
′
t+s), d
′
t+s) + σln
[
pt+s(d
′
t+s|Ωt+s)
]]}
= u(Ωt, d
∗
t )− u(Ωt, d
′
t)
+ Et
{
ρ∑
s=1
βs
[
u(Ωt+s(d
∗
t+s), d
∗
t+s)− u(Ωt+s(d
′
t+s), d
′
t+s) + σln
pt+s(d
′
t+s|Ωt+s(d
′
t+s))
pt+s(d∗t+s|Ωt+s(d∗t+s))
]}
(3.20)
The marriage matching occurs following an exogenously determined process. In particular, let
mt = k, k ∈ {0, 1, 2} be the marital status of the individual at the beginning of period t, where
mt = 0 indicates to remain single, mt = 1 indicates to marry a spouse with a high school degree,
and Mt = 3 indicates to marry a spouse with a college degree. Let Pt(mt+1 = k|Ωt,mt) be the
matching process of the next period if her current period state variable is (Ωt,mt). Then CCP
representation given the marriage matching process can be written as
vt(Ωt, dt = k,mt = 0)− vt(Ωt, dt = 0,mt = 0)
= u(Ωt, d
∗
t )− u(Ωt, d
′
t) +
3∑
j=0
Pt(mt+1 = j)Et
{
ρ∑
s=1
βs
[
u(Ωt+s(d
∗
t+s), d
∗
t+s,mt+s)
− u(Ωt+s(d′t+s), d
′
t+s,mt+s) + σln
pt+s(d
′
t+s|Ωt+s(d
′
t+s),mt+s)
pt+s(d∗t+s|Ωt+s(d∗t+s),mt+s)
]} (3.21)
For j = {0, 1, 2}, denote
At+s(Ωt+s,mt+s = j) =
[
u(Ωt+s(d
∗
t+s), d
∗
t+s|mt+s = j)− u(Ωt+s(d
′
t+s), d
′
t+s|mt+s = j)
+ σln
pt+s(d
′
t+s|Ωt+s(d
′
t+s),mt+s = j)
pt+s(d∗t+s|Ωt+s(d∗t+s),mt+s = j)
] (3.22)
Then
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vt(Ωt, d
∗
t ,mt = 0)− vt(Ωt, d
′
t,mt = 0)
= u(Ωt, d
∗
t )− u(Ωt, d
′
t) +
2∑
j=0
Pt(mt+1 = j)Et
{
ρ∑
s=1
βsAt+s(Ωt+s,mt+s = j)
}
= u(Ωt, d
∗
t )− u(Ωt, d
′
t) +
2∑
j=1
Pt(mt+1 = j)Et
{
ρ∑
s=1
βsAt+s(Ωt+s,mt+s = j)
}
+ Pt(mt+1 = 0)Et
{
βAt+1(Ωt+1,mt+1 = 0) +
2∑
j=1
Pt+1(mt+2 = j|Ωt+2)
[ ρ∑
s=2
βsAt+s(Ωt+s,mt+s = j)
]
+ Pt+1(mt+2 = 0|Ωt+2)
[
β2At+2(Ωt+2,mt+2 = 0) +
2∑
m=0
Pt+3(mt+3 = j|Ωt+2)
× βsE
[
At+s(Ωt+s,mt+s|mt+3 = j)
]]}
(3.23)
Finite State Dependence
Let k1 be the anchor choice where the choice set is defined as Table 1. The path for kj , j ∈ {1, 2, 3}
that satisfies finite state dependence can be found as Table 2. More explanation regarding the finite
state dependence and the associated moment conditions are described in Appendix 9.
k0 k1 k2 k3
d (labor supply) 0 1 0 1
f (fertility) 0 0 1 1
Table 1: The Choice Set
t k1 k0 k2 k0 k2 k0
t+1 k0 k0 k0 k2 k0 k2
t+2 k0 k0 k0 k0 k0 k0
t+3 k0 k0 k0 k0 k0 k0
Table 2: Finite State Dependence
Because husband’s income evolves following AR(1) process without endogenous labor supply
decision, it is not possible to have a finite state dependence regarding average household income.
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For this reason, I follow Kang (2010) and estimate the average household income nonparametrically.
4 Data
I use the National Longitudinal Study of Youth 1979 (NLSY79) and the NLSY79 Child/Young
Adults 1986—2012. Two data sets are linked so that I can match the mother and the children.
The NLSY79 Child/Young Adults provides a variety of outcome measures of each child such as the
highest grade completed and annual earnings during 1986-2012. Because the NLSY79 Child/Young
Adults does not link the father and the children, the data set is not completely symmetric in terms of
child’s outcome measures. 7 The NLSY79 is not a household survey that has matched information
between husband and wife. Instead, for married individual the data provides parts of partner’s
information such as income, age, and the highest grade completed.
My sample consists of female students at age 14-22 in 1979. The original sample consists
of 6,064 female students. Among them 1,708 individuals have missing variables in either height
and weight measured in 1985, the educational attainment of mother and father, and the AFQT
score. When I construct the panel data for each individual, I follow from age 22 to 50, which
results in 126,324 individual-age observations. I drop 21,161 observations if the individual did not
participate the survey for at least one year during age 22 to 50. This results in 105,163 individual-
age observations. Because the baseline model does not include divorce decision, I drop 30,820
observations if the marital status of the individual is either missing, separated, or divorced. I drop
1,125 observations if the highest grade completed of the individual or her husband is less than 8.
I construct the wage rate by dividing the total income from wages and salary in the past calendar
year by the number of hours worked in past calendar year. I drop the 699 observations that belong
to the top and bottom 1% of the wage rate. As a result, I have 73,218 individual-age observations
in the final sample for the estimation.
There are three categories of variables. First, as the initial state variables, I use the AFQT
score, the educational attainment of mother and father, the Body Mass Index (BMI). The body
mass index is constructed based on the formula BMI = Weight(lb)
Height2
× 703. Once schooling period is
ended, woman’s highest grade completed becomes a state variable. Second, I use the labor force
participation, fertility, annual income, annual work hours, marital status of women and husband’s
highest grade completed and annual income. To capture the gains from actual experience in the
labor market in the wage rate, I include two lagged history of labor force participation decisions of
women. For fertility history, I track the timing of the first and the second child birth. Third, when
it comes to the outcome of home production, I use the average educational attainments of children
7I can observe partial information on child’s educational attainment from the household member specific variables
in the NLSY79. It covers the highest grade completed by a daughter and a son so that it does not fully capture the
average outcome of all children. Also, there are too many missing variables.
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which is measured by the years of schooling.
5 Estimation
The model is estimated in three-stages. In the first stage, I estimate marriage matching process,
home production technology, the wage rate of women, the income process of husbands, and the
conditional choice probability. In the second stage, I estimate preference parameters based on
conditional choice probability approach, taking the first stage estimation as given. In the third
stage, I estimate schooling choice for women taking the estimated value function in the second
stage estimation as given.
5.1 First Stage Estimation
In the first stage estimation, I estimate the wage rate, spouse’s income, the average educational
attainment of children, marriage matching, and conditional choice probability. Husband’s income
is estimated as an AR(1) process based on his age, educational attainment and previous income.
The main reason for having different specification for labor market earning between husband and
wife is the data limitation. Because the NLSY79 is not a matched data I do not have equally good
information on husband, for example, the AFQT scores of husbands. The average educational
attainment of children is estimated in a nonparametric way, because it cannot be identified in the
second stage estimation based on CCP representation. I estimate conditional choice probability
(CCP) with multinomial logit regression.
5.2 Second Stage Estimation (CCP)
By using the first-stage estimation and the moment conditions driven based on the conditional
choice probability, I estimate structural parameters for individual’s preference. Let g(Ω,Θ) be the
moment condition. Then GMM estimator can be written as
E[g(Ω,Θ)] = 0
, where Ω is a vector of state variables and Θ is the set of structural parameters. Let
g(Θ) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
gi(Zi,Θ)
be a s× 1 matrix and Dn : s× s random weight matrix, where s is the number of parameters.
Define
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QN (Θ) = g(Θ)
′Dng(Θ)
Then ΘGMM is the solution that minimizes QN (Θ) over Θ ∈ <s. To get the optimal matrix, I
first fix Dn = Is × Is and find Θˆ that minimizes Q0 = g(Θ)′g(Θ). Then I estimate8
Dˆoptimal = Vˆ
−1
0 = E[g(Θ, Θˆ)
′g(Z, Θˆ)]
Finally, ΘˆGMM can be found by minimizing
ΘˆGMM = argminΘQN = g(Z,Θ)
′Dˆoptimalg(Z,Θ)
Given ΘˆGMM , I could estimate variance covariance matrix as follows.
ΘˆGMM
p→ Θ0
√
N(ΘˆGMM −Θ0) d→ N(0,Σ0)
, where
Σ0 = B
−1
0 Ω0B
−1
0
Ω0 = Γ
′
0DV0DΓ0
Γ0 = E[
∂g(Z,Θ0)
∂Θ′
V0 = E[g(Zi,Θ0)g(Zi,Θ0)
′]
B0 = Γ
′
0DΓ0
The estimated value of single women at age 22 is to be used to measure the return to college
education for women. That is the value difference between women with and without college degree
is defined as returns to college education. Although college education can provide nonpecuniary
benefits that can directly affect the schooling choice of women, I define the returns to college
education as the life-time value difference of the women net of the nonpecuniary part. This is to
make the comparison to previous literature more straightforward that usually only focus on the
labor market return to measure the returns to college education.
8I use the following 9 instrument variables, Z = (AFQT,HGC,SPHGC, Spouse’s Income, Wage, BMI, AGE,
NumKid), in the baseline estimation.
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5.3 Estimation for the Schooling Choice
Based on the estimated value function in the second periods, I estimate the schooling choice problem
for women. At the moment of high school graduation, students are characterized by their AFQT
score, the educational attainment of the mother and the father, and the BMI denoted by Z1 =
{AFQT,BMI,Mom′s1emEdu,Dad′s1emEdu}. There is only two types of educational choice,
high school graduates or college graduates. Let Vhigh(Z1) be the value of a single woman of age
22 whose highest educational attainment is a high school degree, and let Vcollege(Z1) be the value
of a single woman of age 22 with a college degree. Every student is single when they decides the
schooling choice. Let U(Z1) be the nonpecuniary benefit or consumption value of college education
net out of the utility associated with the direct cost of college education and foregone earning.
U(Z1) = α0 + α1AFQT + α2BMI + α3MomEdu+ α4DadEdu+ α5FamilyIncome
+ α5DSouth + α6DNortheast + α7DWsest + α8DUrban
(5.1)
I include family income to capture the impact of direct cost and the dummy variables for the
geographic location of student’s residence during high school. The geographic variables are supposed
to capture the regional difference in the direct cost of college education and the consumption value
of college education. Let SVhigh(Z1) = Vhigh(Z1) be the value of a high school senior if she does
not go to college and letSVcollege(Z1) = Vcollege(Z1) + U(Z1) be the value of a high school senior
if she gets a college degree. Then I estimate the following probit model to estimate the schooling
choice. The optimal schooling choice Dcollege can be characterized as
Dcollege = 1 iff y
∗(Z1) > η0 − η1 (5.2)
where η0, η1 follows normal distribution and
y∗(Z1) = SVhigh(Z1)− SVcollege(Z1)
= U(Z1) +
[
Vhigh(Z1)− Vcollege(Z1)
] (5.3)
6 Results
6.1 First Stage Estimation
Table 3 shows the first-stage estimation of the wage rate of women. It suggests that additional
year of schooling increases the wage rate by 4.1%. 10 point increase in AFQT score corresponds
to 3.8% increase in the wage rate. The wage rate increases by both potential experience (age) and
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actual experience in the labor market. The wage increases by 10.9% as individuals age, but the
actual experience has a larger impact on the wage rate of women. In particular, the two-periods
lagged labor force participation increases the wage rate by 19.1%, whereas one-period lagged labor
force participation increases the wage rate by 3.5%. Table 4 shows the first-stage estimation of
spouse’s income. One-period lagged spouses’ income explains large part of the current spouses’
income, but the growth rate is higher for spouses with higher education. In particular, additional
year of schooling increases the annual growth of spouse’ income by 188 dollar. Once I control for
the previous income of the spouse, spouse’s income is not significantly affected by age and age
square in this sample.
I estimate the home production technology nonparametrically because the current choice set—labor
force participation and fertility decision —does not allow me to find paths satisfying the finite state
dependence with respect to the expected kid’s outcome. The nonparametric estimation is used to
predict individual’s expectation over kid’s educational attainment for each state and time.
In doing so, I first estimate the average life-time household income and the average labor
force participation rate of women from time t onward over the life-time. Table 6 and 7 show
the results. First, the labor force participation decision and the fertility decision at the current
period significantly affect the life-time average household income and life-time average labor force
participation rate. In particular, the labor force participation decision increases the expected
average household income by 3.7%, whereas it increases the average labor force participation rate
by 18.1%.
Next, I estimate the home production technology as measured by the average educational at-
tainment of children. In doing so, I use the estimated life-time average household income and
average labor force participation rate as controls. Table 5 shows the estimation result. I also con-
trol mother’s AFQT score, the educational attainment of both parents, and the number of kids in
the household. Mother’s AFQT score is used to be a proxy for the ability measure of the kid. I
include the total number of kids in the household to capture the quantity-quality tradeoff in terms
of kid’s outcome. First, the result shows that both time and money have positive impact on kid’s
educational attainment. In particular, the coefficient of log of the average household income is 0.84,
which implies that doubling average household income increases the kid’s educational outcome by
0.58 year. On the other hand, 0.1 higher average labor force participation rate corresponds to 0.04
decrease in the years of schooling of the kid. Second, a quality-quantity tradeoff exists such that
having additional kid decreases the average kid’s educational attainment by 0.17. Third, mother’s
AFQT score and educational attainment have large impact on kid’s outcome. For example, 10
points higher AFQT score corresponds to 0.18 additional educational attainment of the children,
whereas one additional year of schooling of the mother also leads to 0.18 higher educational attain-
ment of the kids. This suggests the importance of the direct effect of mother’s education on kid’s
outcome.
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Table 8 shows the result of estimating conditional choice probability of the married women.
The baseline choice is working and not having a new baby. The wage rate significantly decreases
the probability of not working and not having a new baby, whereas it increases the probability
of working and having a baby. The current period log household income significantly increases
the probability of working and having a new baby. Lagged labor force participation significantly
decreases the probability of not working. Once I control household income and labor force par-
ticipation history, woman’s own educational attainment does not have significant impact on the
choice probability. Table 9 shows the estimates of the choice probability of single women. Higher
wage increases the probability of working but not having a new baby. In this case, own education
significantly increases the probability of working of single women.
6.2 Second Stage Estimation
Table 11 shows the result of the second stage estimation for the preference parameters. Consump-
tion (0.228) and the average educational attainment of children (58.44) increase the utility. Leisure
is estimated to have negative utility (-0.389). Negative utility from career interruption might ex-
plain this. Having a kid of age less or equal to 2 significantly decreases the utility (-84.35), but it
increases the utility proportion to the household income (0.000736). The cost of childcare is large
in general but the burden can be reduced if the household gets higher income. Being a single leads
to negative utility proportion to the income of the woman (-0.000108). Finally, marrying a husband
with a different educational attainment reduces the utility, which might capture the disutility from
different consumption patterns between husband and wife because they have different educational
backgrounds.
6.3 Third Stage Estimation
Table 11 shows the probit estimation of college enrollment decision conditional on women’s initial
characteristics and estimated future values. First, the value difference between high school grad-
uates and college graduates, which captures the return from college education of single women of
age 22, significantly increases the college education attainment rate (0.0224). Second, higher fam-
ily income significantly increases the college enrollment rate (5.14e-06). This suggests a potential
heterogeneity in the cost of financing college education because of financial friction.9 I include
AFQT, BMI, and the educational attainment of the mother and father to capture the consumption
value of college education. For example, individuals with higher AFQT score might find it easier
to graduate from college. BMI can affect social interaction of the student with others. All of those
factors significantly increase the consumption value of attending the college. To control for different
direct cost of college education, I include regional dummies—South, West, Northeast—and whether
9Parts of the positive correlation could be driven by selection bias associated with unobservable ability.
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the student lives in urban area during high school. It turns out students from south region are
significantly more likely to attend college (0.442) and students who live in urban area is significantly
less likely to attend college (-0.486).
7 Returns to Education for Women
Table 13 shows the estimated returns to college education for single women at age 22 who do not
have kids. By returns to college education, I refer the value difference between getting a college
degree and a high school degree conditional on student’s AFQT, BMI, and educational attainment
of parents at age 22. I do not include the nonpecuniary benefit of college education because it is not
clear to distinguish the return from the cost. Instead, the nonpecuniary benefit and the direct cost
are considered in the third stage estimation that estimates the probability of college attainment
rates.
First, the return is much larger if I consider returns to home production and the assorta-
tive marriage matching. The estimated return for the individual with average characteristic
(AFQT,BMI,MomEdu,DadEdu) = (50, 22.5, 12, 12) is 44.06. 10 If I do not consider returns
from home production and the assortative marriage matching, the corresponding number would be
9.85. Second, the return is higher for women with higher AFQT, lower BMI, and parents with higher
educational attainment. In particular, for women with (BMI, MomEdu,DadEdu) = (22.5, 12, 12),
20 points higher AFQT score corresponds to about 4 higher return, and the difference in returns
between women with AFQT score of 90 and 10 is 15.4. On the other hand, among individu-
als with (AFQT,MomEdu,DadEdu) = (50, 12, 12), those with BMI of 17.5 have 5.6 higher re-
turn than those with BMI of 22.5. Among individuals with (AFQT,BMI) = (50, 22.5), those
with parents’ education (MomEdu,DadEdu) = (16, 16) have 10.5 higher return than those with
(MomEdu,DadEdu) = (12, 12). If I do not consider kid’s educational outcome and assortative
marriage matching, BMI and parents’ educational attainments would have negligible impact on the
return. Therefore, the marriage matching process amplifies the difference in the return from college
education for women by ability, physical appearance, and family background.
Table 16 shows the value of married women at age 22 who do not have kids. The result suggests
complementarity in the value of married couple in terms of educational attainment of husband and
wife. Consider married women with (AFQT,BMI) = (50, 22.5). The sum of value of (wife’s HGC,
husband’s HGC)=(12, 12) and (wife’s HGC, husband’s HGC)=(16, 16) is larger than that of (wife’s
HGC, husband’s HGC)=(12, 16) and (wife’s HGC, husband’s HGC)=(16, 12) by 65.07. The source
of complementarity is utility from marrying to a spouse with the same educational background.
10I normalize the unit of the utility shock occuring every period as 1.
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8 Counterfactual Analysis
The motivation of this paper is to understand the discrepancy between the high college attainment
rate of women and their low labor force participation rates. Because of the data restriction, I can-
not estimate returns to college education for men and compare directly to women counterpart.11
Instead, I do counterfactual analyses and evaluate how labor market earnings, home production
technology, and assortative marriage matching can affect female labor supply and college attain-
ment decision. In this way, the comparison between men and women can be done indirectly through
differences in the wage structure, the spouse’s income process, and contribution to children’s edu-
cational outcome.
First, home production, as measured by the average educational attainments of children, is
quantitatively more important than labor earning difference associated with a college degree in
accounting for returns to college education for women. The returns from the labor market would
explain less than 20% of the total return if I do not account for the returns from home production.
This helps to explain why highly educated female do not participate the labor force as much as the
male counterpart. Thus, the social cost of women’s high college attainment rates and low labor
force participation rates would be smaller than it would be seen without considering its impact on
the educational attainment of the next generation.
Second, a college degree has a large direct effect on children’s educational outcome. This effect
is measured after controlling for the indirect effect of women’s college education on children’s
outcome through household income and average labor force participation rate. For women with
average ability and college educated parents, ignoring the direct effect would reduce the returns to
college education by 74%. The direct effect is larger than the indirect effects. In particular, the
return would decrease by 19% for those women if their educational attainments do not affect the
average household income which is an input in the child’s development process. The indirect effect
through the average labor force participation rate would explain less than 1% of the total return.
Third, the assortative marriage matching explains 21% of the returns to college education for
women with average characteristics. Its impact is largest for high-ability women. In particular,
if I consider women with AFQT score of 90, the returns to college education would decrease by
25% if the marriage matching process does not depend on the educational attainment level.12 For
11NLSY79 Child/Young Adults 1986-2012 matches only between mother and children. Because the educational
attainment of children is used to measure the outcome of home production, I could not estimate the same model for
men. Although NLSY79 has a partial information on the educational attainment of household members, such as the
highest degree completed of the son and daughter, there are too many missing observations.
12In this counterfactual analysis, I assume that the educational attainment does not affect the probability of being
single, marrying high school graduates, and marrying college graduates. In doing so, I adjust the constant term in
the matching estimation so that the aggregate number of women who remain single, marry high school graduates,
and marry college graduates remain the same as before.
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those high-ability individuals, other characteristics, such as parents’ educational attainments or the
BMI do not change the extent to which assortative marriage matching affects the returns to college
education. On the other hand, for low-ability female, the impact of assortative marriage matching
is larger if she has lower BMI score or her parents are highly educated. Thus, assortative marriage
matching would increase inequality between students by family backgrounds especially among those
with low-ability. For high-ability students, a college degree can neutralize the disadvantage in the
marriage market associated with family background or physical appearance.
Fourth, the different wage structure by gender accounts only a small portion of the disparity
in the labor force participation rate between men and women with college degree. If the wage
process of women were to be the same as men, the life-time average labor force participation rate
of a woman with a college degree and average ability would increase by 0.3∼0.8%. On the other
hand, it has a larger effect on women with high school degree such that it would increase the labor
force participation rate by 8% if she is married to a spouse with a high school degree and 12% if
she is married to college educated spouse. Next, spouse’s income process generates a substantial
impact on the labor force participation rate.13 It would suggest that if husband’s income process
is less stable and the average income level of spouse is lower than her own income, the labor force
participation rates of a college educated woman would increase by 40% if she is married to college
educated husband and 80% if she is married to a spouse with a high school degree. Thus the
different income process of spouses between men and women are the single most important reason
to explain the low labor force participation rates of highly educated women.
Finally, I evaluate how much production technology,specified as child’s development process,
would affect female labor supply and the educational outcome of children. First, 10,000 subsidies
to the household with a new born baby would increase the labor supply of women by 8∼11%.
Its impact is larger for college educated women. If the adverse effect of mother’s labor force
participation on kid’s outcome decreases by 10%, the labor market participation rate would increase
by 24 ∼ 37%. Third, if the importance of household income on kid’s development process increases
by 10%, it would increase the labor force participation rates by 22∼ 34%. In both cases, women who
married to spouses with different educational attainments are more sensitive to those technological
changes. Note that if the wage structure of women were to be the same as that of men, it would
have only negligible effects on the labor supply of college educated women. Therefore, a better
childcare service/public education system that can substitute mother’s time effectively and increase
the marginal productivity of household income can have a large impact on female labor supply.
13Because the income process of married women’s is highly discontinuous, OLS estimates would be less precise.
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9 Conclusion
In this paper, I estimate the returns to college education for women accounting for assortative
marriage matching and home production technology. If a college degree did not affect the proba-
bility of marrying high earning spouses, the returns to college education for women would decrease
by 21%. Students’ physical appearance and parents’ educational attainment could explain parts
of positive correlation between students’ family background and college attainment conditional on
ability. This could complement to the previous studies that focus on the liquidity constraint to
explain the disparity in the college enrollment decision between rich and poor students. Also, this
paper suggests that the assortative marriage matching could increase the inequality by family back-
grounds especially among low- ability students. Finally, returns to college education from home
production as measured by kid’s average educational attainment is quantitatively more important
than returns from labor market to explain women’s labor supply and college attainment decision.
Important things remain for the future studies. First, it would be a valuable extension to
endogenize the marriage matching process and the divorce. Second, college major and occupation
choice might be another important margins to explain women’s college attainment decision and
labor supply. In particular, disadvantages in the marriage market could explain why there are
much fewer female students in STEM fields although its labor earning is significantly higher than
other majors. Third, the analysis of estimating returns to college major can readily apply for the
male counterpart. It would be a valuable extension to examine the source of gender differences in
educational choice and labor supply which was not possible in this paper due to the data restriction.
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Appendix A: First Stage Estimation Result
Table 3: Log Wage Regression
Variable lnWage
AFQT 0.00378***
(26.53)
Highest Grade Completed 0.0407***
(25.48)
Age 0.1086***
(23.72)
Age Square -0.000889***
(-13.66)
LD1 0.0353***
(4.28)
LD2 0.191***
(20.21)
Const -1.276***
(-16.56)
No.Obs 27,565
R-squared 0.384
Note. Data comes from the NLSY79. The first stage estimation for the wage rate of women (both married and
single). LD1 and LD2 indicate the lagged labor force participation decision for last two years. t-values are in the
parentheses.
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Table 4: Spouse’s Income
Variable Spouse’s Income
Spouse’s Income in Previous Year 0.880***
(109.87)
Spouse’s Highest Grade Completed 187.78***
(6.72)
Age 61.375
(0.35)
Age Square 3.304
(1.25)
Const -1103.802
(-0.40)
No.Obs 9,831
R-squared 0.6390
Note. The first stage estimation for the spouse’s income. I only include observations such that spouse’s income
in two consecutive years in estimation. Also, I drop observations with the top and bottom 2% of spouse’s income
distribution. t-values are in the parentheses.
Table 5: Average Educational Attainment of Kids
Variable Average Educational Attainment of Kids
Mom’s AFQT 0.0181***
(29.65)
Mom’s Highest Grade Completed 0.176***
(22.99)
Dad’s Highest Grade Completed 0.00121
(0.40)
Average log Household Income 0.837***
(18.69)
Average labor market participation -0.447***
(-6.00)
Number of Kids -0.171***
(-9.94)
Constant 2.384***
(5.13)
No.Obs 17,427
R-squared 0.180
Note. The first stage estimation for children’s educational attainment at age 22 of children. If there are more than
one child, I use the average outcome. Average Log Household Income is the log of the average household income
over the life-cycle. Average Labor Market Participation during Early Years is the number of years a married
woman works from age 22 to 50. Data come from the NLSY79.
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Table 6: Average Life-Time Log Household Income
Variable Average Life-Time Log Household Income(t)
AFQT 0.00172***
(17.38)
Highest Grade Completed 0.0533***
(49.07)
Spouse’s Highest Grade Completed 0.00865***
(18.76)
Age -0.0217***
(-7.03)
Age Square 0.000235***
(5.44)
Dt 0.0365***
(5.40)
Dt−1 -0.0177**
(-3.18)
Dt−2 -0.0122
(-2.07)
NewKid -0.0607***
(-7.31)
lnHouseIncomet 0.129***
(47.24)
Const 8.977***
(169.83)
No.Obs 26,889
R-squared 0.266
Note. The first stage estimation for the average log household income over the life-cycle. Dt, Dt−1, Dt−2 are the
labor force participation decision of current year and two lagged periods. Data come from the NLSY79.
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Table 7: Average Life-Time Average Labor Force Participation Rate
Variable Average Participation Rate in Labor Market
AFQT 0.000305***
(6.32)
Highest Grade Completed -0.00344***
(-6.49)
Spouse’s Highest Grade Completed -0.00107***
(-4.74)
Age -0.0273***
(-18.15)
Age Square 0.000362***
(17.20)
Dt 0.181***
(54.88)
Dt−1 0.0459***
(16.87)
Dt−2 0.0779***
(26.93)
NewKid 0.0151***
(3.73)
lnHouseIncomet 0.0160***
(12.03)
Const 0.412***
(15.41)
No.Obs 26,889
R-squared 0.231
Note. The first stage estimation for the average log household income over the life-cycle. Dt, Dt−1, Dt−2 are the
labor force participation decision of current year and two lagged periods. Data come from the NLSY79.
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Table 8: Conditional Choice Probability, Married Female (Multinomial Logit)
Variable k1 k3 k4
(Dt = 0, bt = 0) (Dt = 0, bt = 1) (Dt = 1, bt = 1)
AFQT 0.160*** 0.00896** -0.00126
(9.15) (2.09) (-0.48)
Highest Grade Completed (HGC) 0.0388 0.0781 0.0323
(1.22) (1.16) (0.58)
Spouse’s Highest Grade Completed (SPHGC) -0.057*** -0.0237 0.0630
(-2.26) (-0.53) (1.48)
HGC× SPHGC 0.00460*** 0.00304** -0.00442
(2.72) (0.96) (-1.38)
log Household Income -0.0338 0.00546 0.368***
(-0.69) (0.04) (4.74)
Age 0.349*** 0.754*** 0.156**
(10.37) (5.01) (2.03)
Age Square -0.00339*** -0.016*** -0.00785***
(-7.60) (-5.89) (-5.98)
Predicted Wage -0.318*** -0.0576 0.264***
(-8.90) (-0.47) (3.82)
Dt−1 -1.590*** -1.523*** 0.120
(-23.84) (-11.46) (1.33)
Dt−2 -1.447*** -0.674*** -0.0336
(-16.46) (-2.99) (-0.25)
Number of Kids 0.385*** 1.116*** 0.876***
(14.74) (17.22) (25.13)
Const -6.532*** -13.319*** -7.747***
(-7.49) (-5.04) (-4.94)
No.Obs 19,898 19,898 19,898
Pseudo R-squared 0.227 0.227 0.227
Note. The multinomial logit regression of the conditional choice probability for married women. Baseline choice
is k2 ((Dt = 1, bt = 0)). Data come from the NLSY79 and NLSY79 Child/Young Adults 1986-2012.
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Table 9: Conditional Choice Probability, Single Female (Logit)
Variable work
AFQT 0.0169***
(12.97)
Highest Grade Completed (HGC) 0.175***
(11.58)
Age -0.661***
(-26.28)
Age Square 0.00919***
(26.87)
Predicted Wage -0.255***
(-10.52)
Dt−1 0.00168
(0.04)
Dt−2 2.991***
(43.63)
Const 9.406***
(19.56)
No.Obs 15,438
Pseudo R-square 0.354
Note. The logit regression of the conditional choice probability of single women. Baseline choice is Dt = 0, not
working. Data come from the NLSY79 and NLSY79 Child/Young Adults 1986-2012.
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Appendix B: Second Stage Estimation
Table 10: Estimation for Preference Parameters
Preference Parameters Estimates
φc (utility from consumption) 0.228***
(3.47)
φl (utility from not working) -0.389
(-2.87)
pi (utility from DYt ×Mt) 0.000736***
(14.20)
κ (utility from the presence of young kid) -85.35***
(-7.12)
φk (utility from kid’s educational outcome) 58.445***
(10.91)
Dsingle (utility from being single) -0.000108***
(-3.68)
φmatch (utility from assortative matching) -1.65e-06
(-2.70)
Note. The second stage estimation based on CCP approach. φc captures the marginal utility from consumption,
φl is the utility related from leisure, pi is the utility from having young children interacted with family income, κ is
the utility from the presence of young kids, φk captures the marginal utility from the average educational outcome
of children, Dsingle captures the utility from being single, φmatch captures the negative utility from marrying a
spouse with different educational attainment.
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Appendix C: Third Stage Estimation
Table 11: Probit Estimation of College Attainment Decision
Preference Parameters Estimates ME
∆V aluesingle 0.0224*** 0.0069***
(2.63) (2.64)
AFQT 0.0143*** 0.0044***
(7.03) (7.23)
BMI 0.0170 0.00525
(1.47) (1.48)
Mom’s Highest Grade Completed 0.0584*** 0.0180***
(4.67) (4.72)
Dad’s Highest Grade Completed 0.0355*** 0.0109***
(3.48) (3.50)
Family Income 5.14e-06*** 1.59e-06**
(3.06) (3.08)
Dummywest 0.149* 0.0456*
(1.88) (1.91)
Dummysouth 0.442*** 0.133***
(6.53) (6.83)
Dummynortheast 0.164** 0.050**
(2.08) (2.10)
DummyUrban -0.486*** -0.153***
(-7.59) (-7.63)
Constant -3.184***
(-6.16)
Note. The third stage estimation. ∆V aluesingle is the value difference between having a college degree and having
a high school degree of a single woman at age 22 which is estimated in the second stage estimation. I also control
the AFQT score, the BMI, and parents’ educational attainments to account for potential heterogeneity in the
nonpecuniary benefit of college education. I include family income, dummy variables for South, Northeast, and
West regions, and the dummy variable for whether the student lived in urban area during high school to account
for the impact of heterogeneous costs for college education.
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Appendix D: Returns to College Education
Table 12: Value Difference by College Attainment (Single at Age 22)
BMI = 17.5, AFQT
MomHGC = 12, DadHGC = 12 10 30 50 70 90
HGC = 12 2775.87 2801.49 2826.93 2852.29 2877.65
HGC = 16 2818.19 2847.51 2876.59 2905.59 2934.67
Difference 42.33 46.03 49.66 53.30 57.02
BMI = 22.5, AFQT
MomHGC = 12, DadHGC = 12 10 30 50 70 90
HGC = 12 2774.50 2800.96 2827.09 2853.03 2878.88
HGC = 16 2810.66 2841.19 2871.15 2900.82 2930.41
Difference 36.16 40.23 44.06 47.79 51.53
BMI = 27.5, AFQT
MomHGC = 12, DadHGC = 12 10 30 50 70 90
HGC = 12 2771.54 2799.14 2826.19 2852.88 2879.35
HGC = 16 2800.58 2832.99 2864.32 2894.97 2925.28
Difference 29.05 33.85 38.12 42.09 45.93
BMI = 17.5, AFQT
MomHGC = 16, DadHGC = 16 10 30 50 70 90
HGC = 12 2770.75 2796.50 2821.91 2847.14 2872.33
HGC = 16 2823.38 2853.16 2882.41 2911.38 2940.29
Difference 52.63 56.66 60.50 64.24 67.96
BMI = 22.5, AFQT
MomHGC = 16, DadHGC = 16 10 30 50 70 90
HGC = 12 2768.75 2795.73 2822.08 2848.04 2873.78
HGC = 16 2814.27 2846.00 2876.67 2906.71 2936.42
Difference 45.52 50.27 54.59 58.67 62.63
BMI = 27.5, AFQT
MomHGC = 16, DadHGC = 16 10 30 50 70 90
HGC = 12 2764.33 2793.07 2820.79 2847.82 2874.39
HGC = 16 2800.92 2835.66 2868.55 2900.22 2931.13
Difference 36.59 42.59 47.76 52.40 56.74
Note. This is the value of a single woman at age 22. The value is calculated based on the estimated structural
parameters in which the life-time period covers from age 22 to age 50.
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Table 13: Value Difference by College Attainment (Single at Age 22)
BMI = 17.5, AFQT
MomHGC = 16, DadHGC = 12 10 30 50 70 90
HGC = 12 2772.98 2798.93 2824.55 2849.99 2875.37
HGC = 16 2818.65 2848.70 2878.24 2907.51 2936.73
Difference 45.67 49.77 53.69 57.52 61.35
BMI = 22.5, AFQT
MomHGC = 16, DadHGC = 12 10 30 50 70 90
HGC = 12 2770.80 2797.89 2824.42 2850.59 2876.56
HGC = 16 2809.29 2841.15 2872.02 2902.30 2932.27
Difference 38.49 43.26 47.60 51.70 55.71
BMI = 27.5, AFQT
MomHGC = 16, DadHGC = 12 10 30 50 70 90
HGC = 12 2766.40 2795.10 2822.89 2850.07 2876.84
HGC = 16 2796.09 2830.73 2863.65 2895.43 2926.52
Difference 29.68 35.63 40.76 45.36 49.67
BMI = 17.5, AFQT
MomHGC = 12, DadHGC = 16 10 30 50 70 90
HGC = 12 2773.84 2799.27 2824.49 2849.62 2874.76
HGC = 16 2822.48 2851.75 2880.72 2909.58 2938.47
Difference 48.63 52.48 56.23 59.96 63.71
BMI = 22.5, AFQT
MomHGC = 12, DadHGC = 16 10 30 50 70 90
HGC = 12 2772.68 2799.03 2824.99 2850.71 2876.33
HGC = 16 2814.81 2845.46 2875.45 2905.08 2934.58
Difference 42.13 46.42 50.46 54.37 58.25
BMI = 27.5, AFQT
MomHGC = 12, DadHGC = 16 10 30 50 70 90
HGC = 12 2769.75 2797.37 2824.35 2850.88 2877.16
HGC = 16 2804.23 2836.97 2868.50 2899.27 2929.62
Difference 34.48 39.59 44.15 48.38 52.46
Note. This is the value of a single woman at age 22. The value is calculated based on the estimated structural
parameters in which the life-time period covers from age 22 to age 50.
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Table 14: (Part 1): Counterfactual Analysis 1 (Returns to College Education)
BMI = 22.5, AFQT
MomHGC = 16, DadHGC = 12 10 30 50 70 90
HGC = 12 2775.87 2801.49 2826.93 2852.29 2877.65
HGC = 16 2818.19 2847.51 2876.59 2905.59 2934.67
Difference 42.33 46.03 49.66 53.30 57.02
Counterfactual 1 AFQT
(Wage) 10 30 50 70 90
HGC = 12 2760.08 2785.31 2810.11 2834.62 2858.92
HGC = 16 2791.05 2819.64 2847.50 2874.87 2901.94
Difference 30.97 34.34 37.39 40.25 43.02
Percentage (85.6) (85.3) (84.9) (84.2) (83.5)
Counterfactual 2 AFQT
(Average Household Income) 10 30 50 70 90
HGC = 12 2744.02 2770.42 2796.52 2822.42 2848.25
HGC = 16 2770.18 2800.58 2830.45 2860.05 2889.59
Difference 26.16 30.16 33.93 37.63 41.34
Percentage (72.3) (75.0) (77.0) (78.7) (80.2)
Counterfactual 3 AFQT
(Average Labor Force Participation Rates) 10 30 50 70 90
HGC = 12 2773.45 2799.91 2826.04 2851.97 2877.82
HGC = 16 2809.27 2839.79 2869.75 2899.41 2929.00
Difference 35.82 39.89 43.71 47.44 51.17
Percentage (99.0) (99.1) (99.2) (99.3) (99.3)
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Table 14: (Part 2) Counterfactual Analysis 1 (Returns to College Education)
Counterfactual 4 AFQT
(No Direct Effect of Education of HGC) 10 30 50 70 90
HGC = 12 2653.92 2680.17 2706.14 2731.96 2757.73
HGC = 16 2650.51 2680.54 2710.13 2739.55 2768.96
Difference -3.41 0.37 4.00 15.9 21.8
Percentage (-9.4) (0.01) (9.07) (15.9) (21.8)
Counterfactual 5 AFQT
(No Assortative Matching by Education) 10 30 50 70 90
HGC = 12 2774.35 2801.24 2827.75 2854.04 2880.23
HGC = 16 2806.13 2834.37 2862.44 2890.54 2918.82
Difference 31.78 33.13 34.69 36.50 38.59
Percentage (87.9) (82.3) (78.7) (76.4) (74.9)
Counterfactual 6 AFQT
(No Direct Utility from Matching) 10 30 50 70 90
HGC = 12 2839.85 2867.67 2895.33 2922.98 2950.76
HGC = 16 2894.58 2924.90 2954.59 2983.98 3013.30
Difference 54.73 57.23 59.26 60.99 62.54
Percentage (151.3) (142.3) (134.5) (127.6) (121.4)
Note. This is the value of a single woman at age 22 under various counterfactual analyses. I report the value of
women with average characteristics such that (BMI, MomHGC, DadHGC) = (22.5, 12, 12). The first counterfac-
tual is over the wage structure such that there is no wage premium from a college education in the labor earnings.
In the second counterfactual, I shut down the impact of woman’s college education on the average household
income. In the third counterfactual, I shut down the impact of woman’s college education on the average labor
force participation rate. In the fourth counterfactual, I assume that there is no direct effect of woman’s college
education on children’s educational outcome. In the fifth counterfactual, I assume that the marriage matching
does not depend on woman’s educational attainment. In the fifth counterfactual, I assume that there is no direct
negative utility from marrying a spouse with different educational attainment.
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Table 15: (Part 1) Counterfactual Analysis 2 (Returns to College Education)
BMI = 22.5, AFQT
MomHGC = 16, DadHGC = 12 10 30 50 70 90
HGC = 12 2775.87 2801.49 2826.93 2852.29 2877.65
HGC = 16 2818.19 2847.51 2876.59 2905.59 2934.67
Difference 42.33 46.03 49.66 53.30 57.02
Counterfactual 1 AFQT
(no disutility from match) 10 30 50 70 90
HGC = 12 2839.85 2867.67 2895.33 2922.98 2950.76
HGC = 16 2894.58 2924.90 2954.59 2983.98 3013.30
Difference 54.73 57.23 59.26 60.99 62.54
Percentage (151.3) (142.3) (134.5) (127.6) (121.4)
BMI = 22.5, MomHGC = 12, DadHGC = 12 AFQT
Counterfactual 2 AFQT
(Average Household Income) 10 30 50 70 90
HGC = 12 2808.37 2837.13 2864.75 2892.38 2920.13
HGC = 16 2854.10 2884.29 2913.89 2943.21 2972.49
Difference 44.73 47.15 49.14 50.83 52.35
Percentage (123.7) (117.2) (111.5) (106.4) (101.6)
Counterfactual 3 AFQT
(Average Labor Force Participation Rate) 10 30 50 70 90
HGC = 12 2808.32 2836.08 2863.70 2891.32 2919.08
HGC = 16 2852.70 2882.89 2912.49 2941.80 2971.08
Difference 44.38 46.81 48.79 50.48 52.00
Percentage (122.7) (116.3) (110.7) (105.6) (100.9)
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Table 15: (Part 2) Counterfactual Analysis 2 (Returns to College Education)
Counterfactual 4 AFQT
(No Direct Effect of HGC on Kid’s Outcome) 10 30 50 70 90
HGC = 12 2687.74 2715.29 2742.75 2770.25 2797.92
HGC = 16 2692.55 2722.23 2751.47 2780.53 2809.63
Difference 4.81 6.96 8.72 10.28 11.71
Percentage (13.3) (17.3) (19.8) (21.5) (22.7)
Counterfactual 5 AFQT
(No Assortative Marriage Matching) 10 30 50 70 90
HGC = 12 2686.69 2714.45 2742.07 2769.69 2797.46
HGC = 16 2694.95 2723.47 2751.91 2780.45 2809.20
Difference 8.26 9.02 9.85 10.75 11.75
Percentage (22.8) (22.4) (22.3) (22.5) (22.8)
Counterfactual 6 AFQT
(No Wage Premium ) 10 30 50 70 90
HGC = 12 2669.19 2695.39 2721.31 2747.10 2772.84
HGC = 16 2669.19 2695.39 2721.31 2747.10 2772.84
Difference 0 0 0 0 0
Percentage (0) (0) (0) (0) (0)
Note. This is the value of a single woman at age 22 under various counterfactual analyses. I report the value of
women with average characteristics such that (BMI, MomHGC, DadHGC) = (22.5, 12, 12). In this counterfactual
analysis, I shut down the channel through which woman’s college education affect various outcomes in a cumulative
way. First, I assume that there is no negative utility from marrying a spouse with different educational attainment.
In the second counterfactual, I also assume that woman’s college education does not affect the average household
income. In the third counterfactual, I also assume that women’s college education does not affect the average
labor force participation rate. In the fourth counterfactual, I additionally assume that there is no direct effect of
a woman’s college education on children’s educational outcome. In the fifth counterfactual, I also assume that
woman’s college does not affect the marriage matching process. In the sixth counterfactual, I also assume that
there is no return from labor market of getting college education.
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Table 16: Complementarity
BMI = 22.5, MomHGC = 12, DadHGC = 12 AFQT
EV22 10 30 50 70 90
(12,12) 2892.65 2917.44 2942.42 2967.59 2992.98
(12,16) 2917.58 2942.34 2967.28 2992.43 3017.80
(16,12) 2863.55 2887.96 2912.53 2937.26 2962.18
(16,16) 2951.70 2976.91 3002.33 3028.00 3053.93
(12,12) and (16,16) 5844.36 5894.35 5944.75 5995.59 6046.91
(12,16) and (16,12) 5781.13 5830.30 5879.81 5929.69 5979.97
Difference 63.23 64.05 64.94 65.90 66.94
Note. This is the value of married women at age 22 with average characteristics (BMI, MomHGC, DadHGC) =
(22.5, 12, 12). To discuss complementarity, I document the sum of values of the married women with spouses of
the same educational attainment and the sum of values of the married women with spouses of different educational
attainments.
Table 17: Probability of Getting a College Degree
(BMI,MomEdu,DadEdu) DummyF1 = 1 (17.5,12,12) (22.5,12,12) (27.5,12,12)
AFQT 10 27.3 25.5 23.2
AFQT 30 40.7 39.0 36.8
AFQT 50 55.3 53.7 51.8
AFQT 70 69.2 67.9 66.3
AFQT 90 80.8 79.8 78.6
(BMI,MomEdu,DadEdu) DummyF3 = 1 (17.5,12,12) (22.5,12,12) (27.5,16,12)
AFQT 10 29.3 27.5 25.1
AFQT 30 43.1 41.3 39.1
AFQT 50 57.7 56.1 54.2
AFQT 70 71.3 70.0 68.5
AFQT 90 82.4 81.4 80.3
(BMI,MomEdu,DadEdu) DummyF5 = 1 (17.5,12,12) (22.5,12,12) (27.5,12,16)
AFQT 10 35.0 33.1 30.4
AFQT 30 49.4 47.6 45.3
AFQT 50 63.8 62.3 60.4
AFQT 70 76.5 71.5 73.9
AFQT 90 86.2 82.6 84.4
Note. This is the estimated probability of getting a college degree based on the third stage estimation. Dummy
F1-DumyF5 indicates the dummy variables for the quintile of family income.
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Table 18: Returns to College Education for Women Net of Cost and Nonpecuniary Benefit
(BMI,MomEdu,DadEdu) DummyF1 = 1 (17.5,12,12) (22.5,12,12) (27.5,12,12)
AFQT 10 -0.98 -1.07 -1.20
AFQT 30 -0.38 -0.45 -0.54
AFQT 50 0.21 0.15 0.07
AFQT 70 0.81 0.75 0.68
AFQT 90 1.44 1.37 1.30
(BMI,MomEdu,DadEdu) DummyF3 = 1 (17.5,12,12) (22.5,12,12) (27.5,12,12)
AFQT 10 -0.88 -0.97 -1.09
AFQT 30 -0.28 -0.35 -0.44
AFQT 50 0.31 0.24 0.17
AFQT 70 0.91 0.85 0.78
AFQT 90 1.55 1.48 1.41
(BMI,MomEdu,DadEdu) DummyF5 = 1 (17.5,12,12) (22.5,12,12) (27.5,12,12)
AFQT 10 -0.62 -0.71 -0.83
AFQT 30 -0.02 -0.10 -0.19
AFQT 50 0.57 0.50 0.42
AFQT 70 1.18 1.11 1.04
AFQT 90 1.84 1.77 1.69
Note. This is the estimated value difference between getting a college degree and getting a high school degree
accounting for nonpecuniary benefit and the direct cost of college education which is calculated from the third stage
estimation. The value is lnP (HGC = 16)− lnP (HGC = 12), which corresponds to
[
V (HGC = 16)−V (HGC =
12)
]
.
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Table 19: Probability of Getting a College Degree (Counterfactual Analysis)
Baseline, DummyF3 = 1 (17.5,12,12) (22.5,12,12) (27.5,12,12)
AFQT 10 29.3 27.5 25.1
AFQT 30 43.1 41.3 39.1
AFQT 50 57.7 56.1 54.2
AFQT 70 71.3 70.0 68.5
AFQT 90 82.4 81.4 80.3
No assortative matching,DummyF3 = 1 (17.5,12,12) (22.5,12,12) (27.5,16,12)
AFQT 10 24.1 24.3 25.9
AFQT 30 34.1 35.2 36.8
AFQT 50 46.8 47.7 49.2
AFQT 70 60.1 60.6 61.7
AFQT 90 72.6 72.7 73.3
Smaller Direct effect, DummyF3 = 1 (17.5,12,12) (22.5,12,12) (27.5,12,16)
AFQT 10 16.0 14.9 13.4
AFQT 30 26.6 25.2 23.6
AFQT 50 39.8 38.3 36.7
AFQT 70 54.4 52.9 51.3
AFQT 90 68.4 67.1 65.7
Note. This is the estimated probability of getting a college degree under counterfactual situations. I focus on
students from the third quintile of family income distribution. In the first counterfactual analysis, I assume that
the marriage matching does not depend on woman’s educational attainment. In the second counterfactual analysis,
I assume that woman’s college education does not have a direct impact on children’s educational outcome.
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Table 20: Returns to College Education for Women Net of Cost and Nonpecuniary Benefit (Coun-
terfactual Analysis)
(BMI,MomEdu,DadEdu) DummyF3 = 1 (17.5,12,12) (22.5,12,12) (27.5,12,12)
AFQT 10 -0.88 -0.97 -1.09
AFQT 30 -0.28 -0.35 -0.44
AFQT 50 0.31 0.24 0.17
AFQT 70 0.91 0.85 0.78
AFQT 90 1.55 1.48 1.41
(BMI,MomEdu,DadEdu) DummyF3 = 1 (17.5,12,12) (22.5,12,12) (27.5,12,12)
AFQT 10 -1.20 -1.14 -1.05
AFQT 30 -0.66 -0.61 -0.54
AFQT 50 -0.13 -0.09 -0.03
AFQT 70 0.41 0.43 0.48
AFQT 90 0.97 0.98 1.01
(BMI,MomEdu,DadEdu) DummyF3 = 1 (17.5,12,12) (22.5,12,12) (27.5,12,12)
AFQT 10 -1.66 -1.74 -1.87
AFQT 30 -1.02 -1.09 -1.18
AFQT 50 -0.41 -0.48 -0.55
AFQT 70 0.17 0.12 0.05
AFQT 90 0.77 0.71 0.65
Note. This is the estimated net value of getting a college degree under counterfactual situations. The value is
lnP (HGC = 16)− lnP (HGC = 12), which corresponds to
[
V (HGC = 16)− V (HGC = 12)
]
.I focus on students
from the third quintile of family income distribution. In the first counterfactual analysis, I assume that the
marriage matching does not depend on woman’s educational attainment. In the second counterfactual analysis, I
assume that woman’s college education does not have a direct impact on children’s educational outcome.
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Figure 1: Net Value of Attending College
Note. This is the estimated value difference between getting a college degree and getting a high school degree
accounting for nonpecuniary benefit and the direct cost of college education which is calculated from the third stage
estimation. The value is lnP (HGC = 16)−lnP (HGC = 12), which corresponds to
[
V (HGC = 16)−V (HGC = 12)
]
.
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Figure 2: Net Value of Attending College - Counterfactual over Wage Rates
Note. This is the estimated net value of getting a college degree accounting for nonpecuniary benefit and the direct
cost of college education under counterfactual situations. The value is lnP (HGC = 16) − lnP (HGC = 12), which
corresponds to
[
V (HGC = 16) − V (HGC = 12)
]
. In this counterfactual, I assume that woman’s college education
does not affect the wage rate.
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Figure 3: Net Value of Attending College - Counterfactual over Direct Impact
on Home Production
Note. This is the estimated net value of getting a college degree accounting for nonpecuniary benefit and the direct
cost of college education under counterfactual situations. The value is lnP (HGC = 16) − lnP (HGC = 12), which
corresponds to
[
V (HGC = 16) − V (HGC = 12)
]
. In this counterfactual, I assume that woman’s college education
does not have a direct impact on children’s educational outcome.
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Figure 4: College Enrollment Rate
Note. Data come from the Current Population Survey. It is the proportion of men/women who graduated from of
4-year colleges.
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Figure 5: Percent of Working Women (Married)
Note. Data come from Current Population Survey. It is the percent of married women who work, who work in
full-time job year-round, and who do not work in each year.
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Figure 6: Percent of Working Men (Married)
Note. Data come from Current Population Survey. It is the percent of married men who work, who work in full-time
job year-round, and who do not work in each year.
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Figure 7: Percent of Working Women (Married, No Related Children)
Note. Data come from Current Population Survey. It is the percent of married women without any related children
who work, who work in full-time job year-round, and who do not work in each year.
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Figure 8: Percent of Working Women (Married with Children under Age 18
Note. Data come from Current Population Survey. It is the percent of married women with children under age 18
who work, who work in full-time job year-round, and who do not work in each year.
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Figure 9: Percent of Working Men (Married, No Related Children)
Note. Data come from Current Population Survey. It is the percent of married men without any related children
who work, who work in full-time job year-round, and who do not work in each year.
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Figure 10: Percent of Working Men (Married with Children under Age 18
Note. Data come from Current Population Survey. It is the percent of married men with children under age 18 who
work, who work in full-time job year-round, and who do not work in each year.
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Figure 11: Women’s Earnings as Percent of Men’s, Median Weekly Earnings of
Full-Time Wage and Salary Workers, in 2012 dollars, 1979-2012 annual average
Note. Data come from the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
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Appendix D: Finite State Dependence
I show how the chosen pair of paths used in the second stage estimation satisfy the finite state
dependence. For example, consider the following choice sequence over the four periods.
D∗2t = (k2, k1, k1, k1)
In each period, the state space evolves as follows.
Ωt+1(kt = k2|Ωt) = (Zt+1, dt−1, dt = 1, bt−3, bt−2, bt−1, bt = 0,
T∑
s=1
bt+1−s,
2∑
s=1
bt+1−s)
Ωt+2(kt+1 = k1|Ωt, kt = k2) =
(Zt+2, dt = 1, dt+1 = 0, bt−2, bt−1, bt = 0, bt+1 = 0,
T∑
s=1
bt+2−s,
2∑
s=1
bt+2−s)
Ωt+3(kt+2 = k1|Ωt, kt = k2, kt+1 = k1) =
(Zt+3, dt+1 = 0, dt+2 = 0, bt−1, bt = 0, bt+1 = 0, bt+2 = 0,
T∑
s=1
bt+3−s,
2∑
s=1
bt+3−s)
Ωt+4(kt+3 = k1|Ωt, kt = k2, kt+1 = k1, kt+2 = 1) =
(Zt+4, dt+2 = 0, dt+3 = 0, bt = 0, bt+1 = 0, bt+2 = 0, bt+3 = 0,
T∑
s=1
bt+4−s,
2∑
s=1
bt+4−s)
After 3 periods I have the following state space.
Ωt+4(D
∗
2t|Ωt) = (Zt+4, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0)
One path that leads to the same Ωt+4 but starting with kt 6= k2 is
DA2t = (k1, k1, k1, k1)
In particular,
Ωt+1(kt = k2|Ωt) = (Zt+1, dt−1, dt = 0, bt−3, bt−2, bt−1, bt = 0,
T∑
s=1
bt+1−s,
2∑
s=1
bt+1−s)
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Ωt+2(kt+1 = k1|Ωt, kt = k2) =
(Zt+2, dt = 0, dt+1 = 0, bt−2, bt−1, bt = 0, bt+1 = 0,
T∑
s=1
bt+2−s,
2∑
s=1
bt+2−s)
Ωt+3(kt+2 = k1|Ωt, kt = k2, kt+1 = k1) =
(Zt+3, dt+1 = 0, dt+2 = 0, bt−1, bt = 0, bt+1 = 0, bt+2 = 0,
T∑
s=1
bt+3−s,
2∑
s=1
bt+3−s)
Ωt+4(kt+3 = k1|Ωt, kt = k2, kt+1 = k1, kt+2 = 1) =
(Zt+4, dt+2 = 0, dt+3 = 0, bt = 0, bt+1 = 0, bt+2 = 0, bt+3 = 0,
T∑
s=1
bt+4−s,
2∑
s=1
bt+4−s)
I have the following state space after 3 periods, which shows that D2t and D
A
2t are a pair of
paths that satisfy the finite state dependence.
Ωt+4(D
A
2t|Ωt) = (Zt+4, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, Nt, 0)
Similarly, I can find a pair of paths, D3t and D
A
3t
D∗3t = (k3, k1, k1, k1)
DA3t = (k1, k3, k1, k1)
Both of them lead to
Ωt+4 = (Zt+4, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, Nt + 1, 0)
Also, for the choice starting kt = k4, I can find the following paths.
D∗4t = (k4, k1, k1, k1)
DA4t = (k1, k3, k1, k1)
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, which leads to
Ωt+4 = (Zt+4, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, Nt + 1, 0)
Based on specified paths, I can construct the moment condition as follows.
ln
pt(Ωt, dt = d2)
pt(Ωt, dt = d1)
= u(Ωt, d2)− u(Ωt, d1) +
3∑
j=1
Pt(Mt+1 = j)×
Et
{
β
[
u(Ωt+1, dt+1 = d1,Mt+1 = m|Ωt, dt = d2)− u(Ωt+1, dt+1 = d2,Mt+1 = m|Ωt, dt = d1)
]
+ β2
[
u(Ωt+2, dt+2 = d1,Mt+2 = m|Ωt, dt = d2, dt+1 = d1)
− u(Ωt+1, dt+1 = d1,Mt+1 = m|Ωt, dt = d1, dt+1 = d2)
]
+ β3
[
u(Ωt+3, dt+3 = d1,Mt+3 = m|Ωt, dt = d2, dt+1 = d1, dt+2 = d1)
− u(Ωt+3, dt+3 = d1,Mt+3 = m|Ωt, dt = d1, dt+1 = d2, dt+2 = d1)
]
+ βln
pt+1(Ωt+1, dt+1 = d1,Mt+1 = m|Ωt, dt = d2)
pt+1(Ωt+1, dt+1 = d2,Mt+1 = m|Ωt, dt = d1)
+ β2ln
pt+2(Ωt+2, dt+2 = d1,Mt+2 = m|Ωt, dt−2 = 1, dt = d2, dt+1 = d1)
pt+2(Ωt+2, dt+2 = d1,Mt+2 = m|Ωt, dt = d1, dt+1 = d2)
+ β3ln
pt+2(Ωt+2, dt+2 = d1,Mt+1 = m|Ωt, dt = d2, dt+1 = d1, dt+2 = d1)
pt+2(Ωt+3, dt+3 = d1,Mt+3 = m|Ωt, dt = d1, dt+1 = d2, dt+2 = d1)
}
+ Pt(Mt+1 = 0)Et
{
β
[
u(Ωt+1, dt+1 = d1,Mt+1 = 0|Ωt, dt = d2)
− u(Ωt+1, dt+1 = d2,Mt+1 = 0|Ωt, dt = d1)
+ ln
pt+1(Ωt+1, dt+1 = d1,Mt+1 = 0|Ωt, dt = d2)
pt+1(Ωt+1, dt+1 = d2,Mt+1 = 0|Ωt, dt = d1)
]
+
3∑
m=1
Pt+1(Mt+2 = m|Ωt+2)×
(
β2
[
u(Ωt+2, dt+2 = d1,Mt+2 = m|Ωt, dt = d2, dt+1 = d1)
− u(Ωt+2, dt+2 = d1,Mt+1 = m|Ωt, dt = d1, dt+1 = d2)
+ ln
pt+2(Ωt+2, dt+2 = d1,Mt+2 = m|Ωt, dt = d2, dt+1 = d1)
pt+2(Ωt+2, dt+2 = d1,Mt+2 = m|Ωt, dt = d1, dt+1 = d2)
]
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+ β3
[
u(Ωt+3, dt+3 = d1,Mt+3 = m|Ωt, dt = d2, dt+1 = d1, dt+2 = d1)
− u(Ωt+3, dt+3 = d1,Mt+3 = m|Ωt, dt = d1, dt+1 = d2, dt+2 = d1)
+ ln
pt+3(Ωt+3, dt+3 = d1,Mt+3 = m|Ωt, dt = d2, dt+1 = d1, dt+2 = d1)
pt+3(Ωt+3, dt+3 = d1,Mt+3 = m|Ωt, dt = d1, dt+1 = d2, dt+2 = d1)
])
+ Pt+1(Mt+2 = 0|Ωt+2)×
(
β2
[
u(Ωt+2, dt+2 = d1,Mt+2 = 0|Ωt, dt = d2, dt+1 = d1)
− u(Ωt+1, dt+1 = d1,Mt+1 = 0|Ωt, dt = d1, dt+1 = d2)
+ ln
pt+2(Ωt+2, dt+2 = d1,Mt+2 = 0|Ωt, dt = d2, dt+1 = d1)
pt+2(Ωt+2, dt+2 = d1,Mt+2 = 0|Ωt, dt = d1, dt+1 = d2)
]
+
3∑
m=0
Pt+3(Mt+3 = m|Ωt+2)β3
[
u(Ωt, dt+3 = d1,Mt+3 = m|Ωt, dt = d2, dt+1 = d1, dt+2 = d1)
− u(Ωt, dt+3 = d1,Mt+1 = 0|Ωt, dt = d1, dt+1 = d2, dt+2 = d1)
+ ln
pt+3(Ωt+3, dt+3 = d1,Mt+3 = m|Ωt, dt = d2, dt+1 = d1, dt+2 = d1)
pt+3(Ωt+3, dt+3 = d1,Mt+3 = 0|Ωt, dt = d1, dt+1 = d2, dt+2 = d1)
])}
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